Talks
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Explanatory Constraints Upon a Williamsonian Theory of Knowledge
Where: University Of Warwick , Work In Progress Seminar When: 6th February 2009
According to Williamson (2000), knowing is a (purely) mental state, and knowledge the most general factive mental state operator (FMSO), one that applies if any FMSO applies at all. This paper develops an intuitively grounded objection to Williamson's account, which seems to leave important aspects of what it is to know unexplained. Consequently, it is alleged, the account gives an inadequate characterisation of knowledge, and so cannot form the basis of a satisfactory theory of knowledge. Several possible responses to the objection are considered before concluding that it rests upon a fallacy concerning the role of explanatory principles in such a theory. As a result of this, Williamson's account is found to meet the necessary constraints upon a theory of knowledge, which turn out to be weaker than might initially be expected.
LikeTime-Consciousness and the Present: A Dynamical Systems Perspective
Where: University Of Warwick , Work In Progress Seminar When: 21st November 2008, 2pm - 4pm
Based on material from my M.Litt. dissertation
Examines several responses to the problem of time-consciousness generated by the following inconsistent propositions: (1) experience takes place wholly within the present, (2) the present is durationless, and (3) we have a phenomenologically direct experience of succession and duration. I argue that Dainton’s ‘overlap model’, which abandons (1), is problematic for reasons concerning Dennett's multiple drafts model of consciousness, and so should be rejected. An alternative model may be found in Varela and van Gelder's dynamical systems interpretation of Husserl’s phenomenology of internal time-consciousness. This rejects a form of (2), proposing that experience takes place in the ‘specious present’, which is not located in objective time, but rather at ‘right-angles’ to it. I argue that this model explains various otherwise puzzling features of Husserl’s account, with important consequences for an understanding of our experience of succession, duration and temporal passage.
Where: University of St Andrews, Postgraduate Reading Party Dates: 19th October 2007 - 22nd October 2007 When: 20th October 2007
In response to McTaggart’s well-known paper concerning the unreality of time, E. J. Lowe (1998; 2002) sets out a response that may be characterised as an adverbial conception of time and tense. In this paper, I draw upon parallels between this kind of adverbialism about tense and Haslanger’s (1998) treatment of the changing properties of objects — an issue that is sometimes known as the problem of temporary intrinsics — in order to elucidate the strengths of Lowe’s A-series account. In particular, I offer an adverbialist analysis of the nature of complex tenses, i.e. those involving multiple temporal points of reference or comparatives, in a way that avoids a reappearance of the alleged regress — an issue that is often thought to be a problem for Lowe. Subject to various conditions concerning quantification over adverbial relations and the reification of times, the adverbial view is found to offer a novel solution to the problem of A-series change that McTaggart describes, as well as clarifying the ultimate source of the dispute between Lowe and McTaggart on this issue.
Is It Absurd to Deny Bivalence?
Where: BUPS Skills Conference, British Undergraduate Philosophy Society (BUPS) Dates: 30th March 2007 - 1st April 2007 When: 4th February 2007
In cases of borderline vagueness, it can seem intuitive to characterise certain utterances as neither true nor false on the grounds of it being unclear which, if either, of these truth values obtains. Williamson (1992) has argued against such a move, claiming that denial of bivalence in the object language entails a denial of the Law of Excluded Middle in the metalanguage, resulting in a contradiction. I argue that this conclusion only follows if the metalanguage is itself classical, and that this should not be accepted by anyone who wishes to deny bivalence. Moreover, a non-classical metalanguage also supports an account of higher-order vagueness, thereby passing another of Williamson's tests and refuting his claim that the denial of bivalence is absurd.
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